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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the exercise of power in the U.S.-Middle East foreign policy 
formation process.  Through application of historical methods, the capacity of state, class 
and historical contingency perspectives of political power to explain the formation of the 
U.S. Israeli loan guarantee policy between 1988 and 1992 is analyzed.  Historical analysis 
supports a central proposition in historical contingency theory, which suggests that 
political power and alignment of class segments varies over time and is impacted by 
respective economic interests.  Class segments unified to create political alliances with 
both Congress and the executive branch to establish preconditions to the provision of U.S. 
loan guarantees to Israel.  As class segments began to mobilize politically, the pro-Israel 
lobby became split. Economic interests and previous state structures led to the 
establishment of class coalitions. Coalition efforts resulted in the establishment of the 1992 
policy linking Israeli foreign aid to Israel’s settlement activities in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, among other conditions.  The analysis suggests that future research 
on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East should not focus only on the actions of state 
managers, but should examine how and under which conditions do social forces external to 
the state influence the foreign policy formation process. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
A recent central concern of foreign relations scholars has been what drives U.S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East. By making state-centered assumptions of political 
power, some researchers conclude that national interests drive U.S. foreign policy.  
Researchers from this perspective (Bass 2003; Hahn 2004) claim that U.S. foreign policy 
in the Middle East has been due to the actions of state managers to preserve U.S. national 
interests in stabilizing the region. According to state-centered foreign relations scholars, 
U.S. Middle Eastern foreign policy tends to support pro-Israel policies due to the shared 
values and goals of the two nations; interest groups external to the state have no influence 
on the development of U.S. foreign policy. 
Whereas state-centered perspectives of power claim that national interests drive 
U.S. foreign policy, society-centered perspectives infer the interests of social groups 
external to the state control the foreign policy formation process.  U.S. national interests 
are not enough to explain U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East because U.S. foreign 
policy in the Middle East isn’t consistently aligned with national interests. From this 
perspective, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East is determined by the interests of the 
pro-Israel lobby (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007).  Interest groups have the power to dictate 
the foreign policy formation process.   
Foreign policy researchers make strict society-centered or state-centered 
assumptions of power, and overlook historical contingency theory.  Whereas state-centered 
and society-centered perspectives of political power view either the state or society as the 
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sole bearers of political power, historical contingency theory acknowledges who holds 
political power varies over time and place.  From this perspective, under some conditions 
the states has increased power, and in other conditions, groups external to the state hold the 
most political power.  In this paper I attempt to bring historical contingency theory into the 
discussion of who holds political power in the foreign policy formation process in the U.S.  
My objective is to test the assumptions of competing theories of political power to 
determine which best explains the development of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.   
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2. STATE AND SOCIETY PERSPECTIVES OF POLITICAL POWER 
 
             Political sociologists have debated over what groups hold power throughout the  
policy formation process in the U.S. State-centered perspectives of political power assume 
 
that the state controls the development of public policy and examine the actions of state 
managers to explain the policy formation process.  On the other hand, society-centered 
perspectives assume that political power is held by groups external to the state.  Historical 
contingency theory aims to solve the debate between state-centered and society-centered 
perspectives of political power by examining the historical contingency of political power.  
From this perspective, the power of the state and the power of class factions vary over 
time. Both the actions within the state and those taken by external social groups must be 
examined to determine how public policy is formed. 
 State-centered perspectives of political power assert the structure and agenda of the 
state dictate political outcomes (Skocpol 1985). By examining state formations and 
expansions, state-centered theories assume political outcomes are independent from class 
structures.  Due to the nation-state’s monopoly of legitimate force within the country’s 
established borders, the state maintains autonomous power over political outcomes. Since 
it has the power to regulate, tax, discipline and punish its citizenry, the state is beyond the 
control of both its general citizenry and elite groups (Mann 1984). From this perspective, 
the nation-state is an autonomous social actor responsible for certain political outcomes 
(Skocpol 1985). National interests dictate the policy formation process.  State managers 
control the policy formation process.  Due to the bureaucratic nature of the roles of state 
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managers, they inherently share a collective consciousness and mission (Mann 1984).  
Capitalists and other groups external to the state are not unified due to competition.  Since 
the state managers are most likely to be unified, when the interests of state managers 
conflict with the interests of external social groups, state managers have the capacity to 
achieve their interests over the interests of others (Block 1977).  In short, according to 
state-centered perspectives of political power, since state managers are unified and external 
groups are not, state managers have the power to dictate public policy, unfettered by 
external group interests.    
 On the other hand, society-centered perspectives assume that the interests of social 
groups external to the state determine political outcomes.  The state is viewed as a neutral 
force negotiating conflict among competing social groups (Dahl 1958). The structure and 
interests of the state do not impact the policy formation process.  Public policy is the result 
of the exercised power of competing interest groups external to the state (Polsby 1960).  
Interests of competing interest groups control the political process, unaffected by the state.  
Political outcomes are viewed as the result negotiations between competing social groups 
external to the state. Class groups and the government are both fragmented. Within the 
state, small competing interest groups have an open space to pursue their self-interest 
(Dahl 1958).  Numerous interest groups are each able to apply tactics to influence political 
outcomes.  From the society-centered perspective, political decision making is made in 
adherence to the demands of political interest groups, uninfluenced by the state.  
Whereas state-centered and society-centered perspectives of political power 
presume power is either with the state or with society, historical contingency theory 
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assumes the power of the state and the power of social groups external to the state vary 
over time (Prechel 1990, 2000). Political outcomes are historically contingent upon both 
the conditions of the state and external political groups (Prechel 1990). Political influence 
within a system varies over time as state structures develop and change (Prechel 1990). 
The state contributes to outcomes but is only relatively autonomous from class structures 
(Poulantzas 1975).  The state functions as a medium managing class conflict and reducing 
resistance from the working class (Poulantzas 1975). Although the state preserves the 
capitalist economic structure, it has a certain amount of freedom from capitalist interests in 
order fulfill its function managing class conflict. Historical contingency theory views the 
state from this perspective.  The state is viewed as relatively autonomous from the 
capitalist class and the amount of autonomy the state has varies over time. In contrast to 
state-centered perspectives of political power, historical contingency theory suggests the 
expansion of the state does not increase state autonomy.  Instead, the expansion of state 
structures creates more opportunities for the ruling class to pursue their economic interests 
politically (Prechel 2000). As the state expands, the relations among the capitalist class 
transform, leading to policy shifts (Liu 1998). The political environment creates constraints 
and incentives, establishing contingent responses.  State structures and the external 
environment change, and in turn, so do class relations and class cohesion. Over time, who 
has the most power in the policy formation process changes. 
According to historical contingency theory, the historical conditions of the 
economy and the expansion of state structures affect state autonomy and the policy 
formation process. In times of economic crisis, the state becomes less autonomous because 
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the capitalist class unifies in times of economic crisis and politically mobilizes to enact 
policy advancing their economic agenda. In contrast, the state is most autonomous during 
periods of economic growth because capitalists are able to realize their economic agendas 
within the prevailing political-legal arrangements. The state also loses autonomy as it 
expands. After state structures are established, they provide the legitimate basis for 
capitalist class fractions to advance their economic interests.  The expansion of state 
structure creates new opportunities for capitalists to pursue their respective economic 
agendas leading to a decrease in state autonomy (Prechel 1990, 2000). The expansion of 
state policy creates a more complex political structure. As the political structure becomes 
more complex, it provides political groups with the legitimate means to mobilize and 
exercise their political power. Historical contingency theory accounts for both the power of 
the state and the power of class fractions as they vary over time.  Political outcomes result 
from historically contingent state structures and external political coalitions.  
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3. THE CASE STUDY 
 
3.1 The 1992 Israeli Loan Guarantee Policy 
 
 The 1992 Israeli Loan Guarantee Policy is the first U.S. foreign policy attempting 
to deter Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) by linking Israeli 
foreign aid to its settlement activities.  This historical case was selected because it appears 
to be a unique point of time when the interests of the U.S. executive branch directly 
conflicted and overrode the interests of the pro-Israel lobby.  This outlier case contradicts 
Walt and Mearsheimer’s (2007) theory that pro-Israeli lobbyist group interests determine 
U.S. policy in the Middle East. By understanding the details of how the political process 
resulted in this particular outcome, we can better understand how U.S. foreign policy in the 
Middle East is developed. 
The case study was used as the unit of analysis because it is a holistic approach that 
best analyzes processes and explains a large number of interdependent variables. By using 
a case study, detailed observations can be made over a long period of time. Case studies 
maintain high internal validity since they provids an accurate in-depth description and 
analysis of observed reality (Gagnon 2010).   By exploring the details of the political 
process behind this particular case, we can understand how U.S. foreign policy is enacted. 
 Archival data was collected from the Bush Presidential Library archives. Archival 
research has the benefit of representing social processes as they transform over time and 
location (Hill 1993). Data was extracted from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request 
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2003-0255-F. Archival data emerging from the Bush Presidential Library was utilized 
because of its accuracy. Government archival documents score highly in Scott’s (1990) 
criteria assessing historical evidence: credibility, authenticity, representativeness and 
meaning. The archival documents are applied to demonstrate how political coalitions 
emerged, developed, and evolved while accounting for historical contexts (Clemens 2007). 
By using archival documents to historically trace the formation of the foreign policy, we 
can understand how political actors constructed and reconstructed social arrangements 
leading up to particular political outcomes.  
 This study implements evenemential historical analysis. Evenemential analysis 
denies teleological assumptions that history is not contingent as well as experimental 
assumptions that historical laws lead to the eruption of events. Instead, evenemential 
historical analysis assumes social relationships are characterized by path dependency. 
From a path dependence perspective, an event occurring at an earlier moment of time 
affects the possible outcomes of future events. Therefore, when conducting evenemential 
historical analysis one must follow sequences of events in order to understand causal 
mechanisms. By employing evenemential historical analysis, I trace key events to identify 
how the 1992 Israeli loan guarantee policy came to fruition.   
 
3.2 Proposition One: State-Centered Perspective 
 
 If the assumptions of state-centered perspectives of political power correctly apply 
to this historical case, the state’s formation of the foreign policy linking Israeli loan 
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guarantees with settlement expansion was a result of the state, unaffected by the demands 
of social groups external to the state. The policy can be traced back to the agenda and 
structures of the state. The foreign policy was established because the state structure and 
agenda prompted state officials to use their political power to create the policy. If state-
centered assumptions of political power best explain this case, state officials were the key 
players behind the initiation and implementation of the policy and external class segments 
did not influence the formation of the policy.  
 
3.3 Proposition Two: Society-Centered Perspective 
 
 If society-centered perspectives of political power best explain this case, the U.S. 
foreign policy linking Israeli loan guarantees with settlement expansion was a result of the 
exercised power of competing interest groups external to the state, unaffected by the state. 
The foreign policy is not related to the state structure or national interests, but instead is the 
result of the political actions taken by competing interest groups. If society-centered 
assumptions of political power best explain this case, interest groups were the key players 
behind the initiation and implementation of the policy and the structure and interests of the 
state did not affect the foreign policy formation process.  
 
3.4 Proposition Three: Historical Contingency Theory
 
            If historical contingency theory assumptions best explain this historical case, the  
?
?
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 U.S. foreign policy linking Israeli loan guarantees with settlement expansion was a result 
of both the state structure and the exercised power of external political coalitions. As the 
state structure expanded, it created opportunities for political groups to mobilize and direct 
their efforts at revising the policy. The unity of external class segments is not a constant, 
but varies over time in relation to the changing rates of capital accumulation (Prechel 
1990). Changing historical, economic and state structures transformed the political 
interests and relations among different class segments, leading to the establishment of the 
policy.  
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4. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 The Rise of Soviet Jewish Refugees and the Power of the Pro-Israel Lobby 
 
As the Cold War came to a close, the USSR loosened its immigration restrictions 
leading to an increase of Soviet Jewish refugees seeking to flee persecution prevalent in the 
USSR.  By 1988, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) became overrun 
by Soviet refugee applications for admission into the U.S. However, as the number of 
refugee applicants rose, the INS budget was not adequately increased to accommodate for 
the increased need for services. Rather than mobilizing to increase the budget, state 
managers initiated efforts to revise its admittance policy of Soviet Jewish refugees (Lazin 
2005). These efforts were largely made in response to the efforts of the pro-Israel lobby.    
The pro-Israel lobby is an ideological interest group made up of a loose network of formal 
and informal groups and individuals seeking politically pressure the U.S. government to 
act in the interests of Israel.  The pro-Israel lobby was able to form a coalition with the 
executive branch to limit the number of Soviet Jewish refugees to be admitted into the U.S. 
and push the refugees towards Israel. 
Prior to the change in U.S. immigration policy, Soviet Jewish refugees attempting 
to migrate to the U.S. were required to go through Accelerated Third Country Processing 
(ATCP). Instead of applying and being processed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Soviet 
Jewish refugees had to first obtain exit permission from the USSR. Only then could they 
leave for Rome to go through ATCP to immigrate to the U.S.  In order to obtain exit 
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permission, Soviet refugees had to receive an invitation from a relative abroad.  This was 
problematic for Soviet refugees who wanted to immigrate to the U.S. but did not have 
familial ties.  Soviet refugees who did not have family in the U.S. would obtain an 
invitation from Israel, which would provide them with permission to exit the USSR. 
However, instead of immigrating to Israel, where job opportunities were weak, in order to 
pursue their economic self-interest, the immigrants would instead go to Rome, where they 
could obtain a refugee visa to immigrate to the U.S. through ATCP. This process created 
problems for the Israel, which planned to receive the refugees who requested and obtained 
an invitation to exit the USSR, (Lazin 2005).  
In response to issues caused by ATCP, the Jewish Agency and Liaison Bureau 
mobilized to pressure the U.S. government to cease all financial support for the Soviet 
dropouts. The Jewish Agency and the Liason Bureau were particularly interested in this 
issue because they received funds from Israel upon assisting refugee relocation to Israel.  
This motivated the organizations to put pressure the Department of State to change INS 
policy by establishing immigration caps and requiring refugees to prove their refugee 
status (Lazin 2005). The Jewish Agency and the Liaison Bureau began to concentrate their 
efforts by lobbying the Department of State and executive branch. At the time, the pro-
Israel lobby had a strong relationship with the executive branch due to executive branch 
dependence on Israel for support against the USSR throughout the Cold War. Due to the 
pro-Israel lobby’s relationship and influence on Howard Eugene Douglas, the U.S. 
Ambassador at Large and Coordinator for Refugee Affairs at the State Department, the 
executive branch began to question its Soviet Jewish refugee policy (Lazin 2005).  
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After meeting with the heads of the Liaison Bureau and the Jewish Agency in 1988, 
Howard Eugene Douglas suspended and eventually closed ATCP.  It was also announced 
the U.S. would be requiring Soviet Jews prove their refugee status by providing concrete 
evidence of individual persecution and immigration caps would apply. Due to pro-Israel 
lobbyist pressure on the executive branch, U.S. policy changed from accepting all Soviet 
Jews, to accepting those proving their refugee status, which lead some Soviet refugees to 
be denied entry into the U.S. (Beyer 1991). Upon denial of refugee status and rejection of 
parole into the U.S., many Soviet refugees were forced to immigrate to Israel. 
Throughout the Cold War, the executive branch was dependent upon Israeli support 
to maintain its influence in the region. A total of $45.6 billion in foreign aid was provided 
by the U.S. to Israel throughout the Cold War (Sharp 2010). However, in November 1989 
the Berlin Wall was torn down, establishing the start of the dissolution of the USSR.  In 
response to this contingency, Israeli power in relationship to the U.S. executive branch 
decreased, as the U.S. was no longer reliant upon Israel and foreign pro-Israel groups to 
manage the communist threat.  
As the Cold War was coming to a close, the executive branch began to question the 
value of uncontested support for Israel.  President Bush and Secretary of State Baker 
formed an alliance with Senate minority leader Bob Dole to change the structure of foreign 
aid to more adequately represent the new power relations within the New World Order. In 
January 1990, Dole proposed a 5% cut to Israeli foreign aid in order to free funds to be 
spent on supporting the democracies emerging among the decay of the USSR.  Shortly 
after, the Department of State endorsed Dole’s proposition. The U.S. Ambassador to Israel, 
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Dr. William Brown, publically announced the standard $1.2 billion annual allocation of 
foreign aid to Israel was no longer necessary (Felton 1990a). Republican Senator Bob Dole 
helped expand the coalition among his fellow members in Congress. Members of the 
Congressional Black Caucus, Representative Gus Savage and Representative George 
Crockett, Democrat Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Robert Byrd, Democrat 
Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations 
Representative David Obey, and Republican House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich all 
joined the coalition supporting a limit on foreign aid to Israel (Felton1990a; Felton 1990b).  
Nevertheless, support to decrease funds to Israel did not receive widespread 
traction in Congress.  Although the pro-Israel lobby had decreased influence over the 
executive branch, the pro-Israel lobby still maintained their power in Congress. Many 
members in Congress relied upon the pro-Israel lobby for re-election campaign support.  
Immediately after Dole made his proposal, pro-Israel lobbyist groups mobilized politically 
and pressured Congress to challenge the proposal. This political strategy succeeded as 73 
senators signed a letter to President Bush voicing their lack of support for Senator Dole’s 
proposal to decrease funds to Israel (Felton 1990c).  
Senator Dole explained public political support was minimized due to fear for 
repercussions from the pro-Israel lobby on upcoming congressional election campaigns 
(Rasky 1990). Despite the lack of public support in Congress, the arguments made by Dole 
had a large scale impact. Major American news agencies began to recount Dole’s 
arguments about Israel’s decreased importance after the Cold War.  It was reported in the 
New York Times:  
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Supporters of Israel in Congress and among Jewish organizations 
acknowledge that Israel’s backing within the United States is not as deep as 
it once was, reflecting a tangle of factors, like Israel’s role in putting down 
protests on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip and the perception that 
Israel is no longer so strategically important, given the fading of the Soviet 
theat. (Schmidt 1990) 
 
 
Although historical circumstances shifted dependencies and coalitions causing the 
Israel and foreign pro-Israeli organizations to lessen its power over the executive branch, in 
September 1989, Israeli Finance Minister Shimon Peres made a request to the executive 
branch for $400 million in loan guarantees to manage the increased number of Soviet 
refugees entering into Israel (Felton 1990c). The request was not endorsed by the executive 
branch and Senator Dole maintained a coalition against increasing aid to Israel, but the 
majority of Senate supported the housing guarantees for Israel. On February 8, 1990, the 
Chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Senator Patrick 
Leahy (Democrat), and senior minority member of the Appropriations Subcommittee on 
Foreign Operations, Senator Bob Kasten (Republican) introduced Senate Bill 2119 
granting Israel $400 million in loan guarantees, among other benefits.   
Senate Bill 2119 was supported by the pro-Israel lobby and its friends in Congress. 
However, pro-Arab lobbyists were strongly against the policy due to Israeli officials 
stating the funds would go towards building homes in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
(OPT). Pro-Arab lobbyist groups were strongly against increased settlement activity as 
they agreed with the Department of State that the settlements are an obstacle to Arab peace 
with Israel (Felton 1990c). Pro-Arab lobbyists voiced concern that the needs for the loan 
guarantees were not due to the humanitarian need for assistance, as expressed by the pro-
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Israel lobby, but were instead due to the pro-Israel lobby’s efforts to establish immigration 
quotas:  
The whole “need” for the $400 million in guarantees goes back to the 
leveraging of the U.S. by Israel. Remember, it was the American Jewish 
community, the Congress, and U.S. Presidents, not Israel, who lobbied for 
years to free Soviet Jews. But, then Israel lobbied us for 50,000 quota so that 
most of these immigrants had to go to Israel only, even though a large 
majority preferred to come to the U.S. Not only was it morally wrong for the 
U.S. to acquiesce in this limitation on the freedom of choice, we deprived 
ourselves of an important, skilled pool of immigrants. (Ellsworth 1990) 
 
However, the pro-Israel lobby dismissed pro-Arab lobbyist claims, saying Arabs oppose all 
immigration to Israel and are willing to blame Israel for anything to stop Jewish 
immigration (Felton 1990c).  
The push for increased funds to support Soviet Refugees in Israel was achieved 
over the interests of the executive branch and its small coalition in Congress with the 
passage of the first Israeli housing loan guarantee policy attached to an act promoted by 
President Bush to provide funding to the newly emerging democracies in Nicaragua and 
Panama. The Israeli housing loan guarantee policy was originally established on May 25, 
1990 when Representative Jamie Whitten of the House Appropriation Committee 
sponsored the attachment of S. 2119 to the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 
for Disaster Assistance, Food Stamps, Unemployment Compensation Administration, and 
Other Urgent Needs, and Transfers and Reducing Funds Budgeted for Military Spending 
Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-302). The Act, introduced on March 27, 1990, appropriated $720 
million to Panama and Nicaragua as well as $1.2 billion for food stamps and $400 million 
to veterans programs. Despite Dole’s coalition against increasing aid to Israel, after the act 
was introduced, only members of the Congressional Black Caucus attempted to delete the 
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funds appropriated to housing guarantees for Israel. The Act was passed in House on April 
3, 1990, and passed Senate on April 24, 1990. The conference report was agreed to on May 
24, 1990, and the Act was signed into law the next day. Since the Bill was added to an Act 
supported by the President, he was pressured into signing the Act rather than making use 
of his veto (Bush 1990).   
The approval of the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1990 was 
the largest amount ever guaranteed under the housing program. In order to get the Bill 
passed, the pro-Israel lobby pressured Congress to lift numerous limits on U.S. loan 
guarantee policies, including a $100 million annual cap on loan guarantees, a $25 million 
limit on the amount of loans annually granted to a single country, management fees, 
requirements that 90% of the funds must go to households with below average income, and 
a $2.188 billion limit on the total number of loans guaranteed. The loan proceeds did not 
oblige Israel to spend the funds on U.S. products, nor did they require the funds be spent 
on low income families in accordance with section 223(j) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961. The Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1990 didn’t have specific 
wording regarding where the funds were to be spent, although it was informally agreed the 
funds were not to be directly spent in territory Israel occupied after the War of 1967. 
According to John Felton from Congressional Quarterly Weekly: 
Leahy said he and other members of Congress will want assurances that no 
U.S. taxpayer money will be used to finance developments in the occupied 
territories for the Soviet Jews or any other immigrants. But Leahy said he 
sees no need for Congress to impose formal conditions of the aid because 
longstanding U.S. policy already addresses the matter. Several 
administration officials said that every U.S. aid agreement with Israel 
contains a clause stating that none of the money can be used in the occupied 
territories. The officials said that Israel could spend its own money in the 
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territories and then use the U.S. funds only within the pre-1967 war borders. 
(February 17, 1990; P 538) 
 
 This was in congruence with previous U.S. foreign policy which condemns Israeli 
settlements. Although not formally stipulated by Congress, Baker reported the executive 
branch would only release the funds once Israel provided the U.S. with a guarantee it 
would not spend the funds on settlements. This created a delay between the passage of the 
law and the distribution of funds. Although the Act was passed on May 25, 1990, the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) under the authority of the executive 
branch did not release the funds until ten months later, after the Department of State 
received a written guarantee from Israel that funding coming from the loan guarantees 
would not be spent in the OPT, as well as information from Israel on housing plans and the 
financial incentives for which the funds would be used. The Israeli housing loan 
guarantees were approved with the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 
1990 with only the small compromise made between the executive branch and Israel which 
forced Israel to provide limited information on settlements in the OPT (General 
Accounting Office 1992). 
In conclusion, despite the executive branch led efforts to decrease aid to Israel, the 
coalition between the Appropriations Committee and the pro-Israel lobby initiated the 
passage of the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1990 with a bill 
attached providing funds for Israel through guaranteed housing loans. Although the 
President did not approve of the policy, he signed the Act into law due to his priority of 
appropriating funds to newly emerging democracies in Panama and Nicaragua. Even 
though the coalition was unable to stop the loan guarantees from being released without 
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strings attached, the executive branch was able to use its administrative power to delay the 
distribution of the funds until Israel compromised by providing the U.S. with information 
about Israeli settlements in the OPT. 
 
4.2 Class Unity Reacting to the New World Order 
 
The development of the loan guarantee policy through the Dire Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1990 came about with little influence from pro-
business groups. However, once the early 1990s recession hit in July of 1990, pro-business 
groups (including various local chambers of commerce, representatives of Bear Stearns 
and BMI Capital, the Arab-American Business and Professional Association and the 
CATO Institute) joined the coalition opposing the housing loan guarantees without pre-
conditions for Israel. In response to the 1990s economic recession and scarcity of 
economic resources, business and finance lobbyist groups began to compete for the 
dispersion of government funds. Loan guarantees were pursued by Israel for the purpose of 
obtaining a better interest rate on loans pursued in the private market. Allowing Israel to 
obtain a better deal on loans than U.S. businesses during the poor economic times caused 
pro-business groups to organize and question the government on the true value and cost of 
the loan guarantee policy. The nature of the loan guarantees did not benefit finance 
capitalists, who financially benefitted from the high interest rates associated with Israeli 
loans not guaranteed by the U.S. government.  Israeli loan guarantees create risk for the 
U.S. government since they ensure the U.S. is held financially responsible for the loans if 
 20 
 
Israel were to default. Although many Senators echoed pro-Israel lobbyist claims the loan 
guarantees would not cost the U.S. anything, the free-market pro-business business think 
tank, the Cato Institute, compiled and released information stating the loans could cost 
U.S. taxpayers up to $800 million (Richman 1991). Standard & Poor’s, an American 
financial service company, even rated Israel with a credit grade of “BBB-” which is the 
lowest investment grade rate possible (Doherty 1992a).  
On top of pro-business groups questioning the Israeli economy, the state also 
questioned Israel’s overall fiscal responsibility. According to a General Accounting Office 
report issued in February 1992:  
The Israeli government’s reliance on subsidies and incentives to encourage 
developers to build in less desirable locations, including the occupied 
territories is costly. U.S. and Israel officials estimate that builders may be 
unable to sell as much as 40 percent of the newly constructed housing units 
and will probably exercise the government purchase commitments.  
 
The economic downturn prompted pro-business groups to mobilize and seek for resources 
to be allocated within the U.S. instead of abroad. With these motives they joined the 
coalition with the executive branch, Dole’s coalition in Congress, and pro-Arab lobbyists. 
The pro-business groups began to contact members within the U.S. government, and 
expressed their lack of support for Israeli loan guarantees without preconditions. As groups 
publically questioned the financial responsibility of providing loan guarantees to Israel 
without pre-conditions, the executive branch’s coalition gained political leverage. 
As the financial situation made individuals in the U.S. unsure about the financial 
responsibility of providing Israel with loans without preconditions, local leaders began to 
criticize the policy.  Mayors, the chambers of commerce, and other local leaders began to 
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campaign against the granting of loan guarantees to Israel when the U.S. economy is in 
turmoil. One mayor wrote in concern:  
I find it totally absurd to loan any foreign country, which at this time I will 
use Israel’s request of a $10 billion loan in their absorption program for new 
immigrants as a prime example, with the growing number of people being 
unemployed, the swelling of public aid rolls, and the decay of our own 
cities; this is becoming very distasteful with the people of America. (Noren, 
August 13, 1991) 
 
The support of the pro-business lobby increased the power of the coalition against 
providing loan guarantees to Israel without preconditions. According to a report by 
Congressional Quarterly (Doherty 1992b): 
Several members of Congress said the administration’s hand was immensely 
strengthened by the intense, election-year backlash against foreign aid in 
this country, which blunted congressional opposition to Bush’s hard line. In 
meetings with lawmakers on the issue, both Bush and Secretary of State 
James A. Baker III frequently cited polls showing that the American people 
overwhelmingly supported the administration’s position, according to 
congressional sources.  
 
Changes in economic conditions transformed the political conditions impacting the loan 
guarantee policy.  As pro-business groups teamed up with the executive branch and its 
growing number of allies, the public began to question the fiscal responsibility of 
providing loan guarantees to Israel.  Public disapproval of the foreign aid increased the 
political power of the coalition against providing loan guarantees to Israel without 
preconditions.  
The early 1990s recession led pro-business groups to question not only the fiscal 
responsibility of the U.S. providing loan guarantees to Israel, but also the fiscal 
responsibility of the entirety of Israel’s economic system:  
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But the Israeli economy, a state-dominated economy, is not vibrant; it is 
virtually stagnant. For a free market economy, immigrants are a boon. For a 
state-run economy, immigrants are a burden. In Israel, immigrant physicians 
and scientists are driving cabs and scrubbing floors- when they are employed 
at all. They are not at fault. What is at fault is a government that spends 80 
percent of a wealth created in Israel; that politically controls investment, 
with all the patronage and corruption that kind of a system inevitably 
produces; that inflates its money supply for political ends, with devastating 
consequences for savings; that maintains some of the highest tax rates in the 
world; and that fosters a near monopoly on labor, with resulting high 
unemployment. (Beyer 1991:91) 
 
As a result, pro-business groups increased their political pressure on the executive branch, 
requesting for additional pro-capitalist incentives to be linked to conditions attached to the 
loan guarantees. After the recession hit, pro-business groups began sending President Bush 
letters of support for opposing the loan guarantees without preconditions.  Board members 
of both BMI Capital and Bear Sterns came out to voice their support of the president’s 
policy of establishing conditions for the loan guarantees.  
Even through there were interlocks between the governing boards of pro-business 
and pro-Israel lobbyist groups, the two groups differed in their support of the policy. Upon 
the economic downturn, in many cases class status triumphed over cultural status as 
businessmen began to support the pro-business lobbyist efforts opposing loan guarantees 
without preconditions over opposing pro-Israel lobbyist efforts.  Jerome Goldstein, board 
member of both Bear Sterns and the Board of Governors of the American Jewish 
Committee, even went out to voice support for the policy, describing the policy linking 
settlements to loan guarantees as “our best course of action” (Goldstein 1991).  
 Just months after the recession hit, in response to the invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. 
led a coalition against Iraq, thus igniting the seven-month-long Gulf War. The relationship 
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among Arab countries, the pro-Arab lobby and the U.S. executive branch faced a 
significant change during and after the Gulf War. As political affiliation and bureaucratic 
development with these countries expanded, national political alignments transformed.  
Whereas the development of the policy before the Gulf War was not largely impacted by 
actions of pro-Arab groups, the loan guarantee policy after the Gulf War displayed 
significant influence from their demands.  
Throughout the Gulf War, the U.S. maintained a coalition of forces to fight in Iraq. 
Amidst the Gulf War, the Bush Administration was able to maintain an anti-Iraq coalition 
through the establishment of strong ties with Arab countries by increasing diplomatic 
relations through the Department of State and National Security Council. This information 
network, originally established to manage the Gulf War, eventually produced the 
organizational structure necessary for the countries to mobilize, opening up the opportunity 
to initiate the Arab-Israel peace process (Ben-Zvi 1993).  
Although the opportunity for peace opened up as the Gulf War concluded, Arab 
countries had a set of expectations before the peace process would be initiated.  Pro-Arab 
groups demanded settlements stop before the peace process started (Palestine Arab 
Delegation 1991). Because of increased American dependence on Arabs throughout the 
Gulf War and their necessary diplomatic involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace process, the 
executive branch of the U.S. government complied with pro-Arab group demands to 
diplomatically pressure Israel to cease settlement activity. 
In March 1991, the Department of State released its findings on settlements in the 
OPT. The report exposed Israeli government financial support for settlements in the OPT. 
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Although the findings exhibited proof Israel provided financial support to settlements, it 
did not demonstrate Israeli violation of the terms of agreement within the Dire Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1990.  Although Israel provided funds to the 
settlements, it claimed the particular loan guarantees funds were not used for settlements. 
This issue led Congress to discuss and question the fungibility of the loans: Is providing 
Israel with loan guarantees freeing up government funds to build on settlements?  
During a congressional hearing on February 21, 1991 held by Representative David 
Obey, Americans for Peace Now, a left-wing pro-Israel group, testified: “the best way for 
the U.S. to condition the loan guarantees is on Israel’s freezing settlement activities” 
(Curtiss 1992). The Department of State found U.S. funds opened up Israel’s budget, 
allowing Israel to allot $82.5 million towards settlements. Additionally, the Department of 
State recognized Israel’s support for settlements went beyond the verified $82.5 million, 
claiming Israel furthered its support of settlements by establishing other financial 
opportunities and incentives for Soviet-Jews to migrate to the West Bank (Department of 
State 1991).  The report concluded there are two major problems with aiding Israel as they 
expanded settlements: 1) It is impossible to directly link the use of U.S. funds towards 
Israeli settlements, due to the fungability of funds, and 2) The Israeli budget alone cannot 
quantify the amount of support Israel provides to settlements since subsistence to Israeli 
settlements can be found in other non-directly related budget line items (Welch 1991). The 
findings of the report induced the argument if it were against U.S. foreign policy to support 
Israeli settlements, loan guarantees and other American funds provided to Israel should be 
linked to settlement growth.  
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Just over a month after USAID released the $4 million in loan guarantees in 
accordance to the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1990, Israel’s 
ambassador to the U.S. announced Israel would be requesting an additional $10 billion in 
loan guarantees without preconditions. As the coalition against providing Israel with loan 
guarantees without preconditions grew, members of Congress began to voice the desire to 
decrease the amount of aid received by Israel. Even Senator Bob Kerrey, who was 
currently running for president in the democrat primaries, voiced support for linking 
settlements with loan guarantees.  
The executive branch took steps to stop the new request for loan guarantees from 
being provided to Israel without preconditions. Baker met with Prime Minister Shamir 
requesting Israel delay their formal request for loan guarantees until after the Madrid Peace 
Conference, but Shamir refused. Despite the lack of U.S. executive branch support for the 
loan guarantees, Israel continued to plan its budget to include a $2 billion loan from the 
U.S. One day after the Israeli budget was released, knowing Israel was going to make its 
request despite the lack of approval of the executive branch, Baker publically appealed to 
Congress to delay Israel’s request once it was made. Baker immediately began to meet 
with members of Congress to verify their support against the loan guarantees before Israel 
made its formal request. Due to Baker’s efforts, even before Israel made its request, the 
chairs of both the House and Senate Appropriations committees controlling foreign aid, 
Senator Leahy and Representative Obey, voiced their support for the President’s request to 
delay the loan guarantees.  
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On September 6, 1991, Israel formally requested the U.S. provide Israel $10 billion 
in loan guarantees over the next five years without preconditions. On this same date, 
President Bush asked Congress to delay Israel’s request for 120 days in order to maintain 
Arab attendance at the Madrid Peace Conference to be held October 30, 1991. President 
Bush immediately began to make calls to members of the Senate to get support for the 
delay. House majority leader Tom Foley and Senate majority leader George Mitchell both 
supported the president’s decision to delay the loan guarantees, despite their strong ties 
with the pro-Israel lobby which supported the immediate implementation of the loan 
guarantees without preconditions. Senator Ted Stevens, a member of the Appropriations 
Committee also voiced his support, but informed the President that the bill needed to be 
stopped in the Senate Foreign Operations Appropriations subcommittee, as he was unsure 
if Congress would be able to stand up to the pro-Israel lobby during congressional 
campaign season.  
Although congressional support to delay the loan guarantees increased, some 
members of Congress did not support the President’s request to delay distribution of the 
loan guarantees, voicing their dependence on AIPAC support for upcoming congressional 
campaigns (McClure 1991).  In order to consolidate support, President Bush met with the 
chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Patrick 
Leahy, as well as Senators Daniel Inouye and Robert Kasten. During the meeting with the 
Senators, President Bush made a promise that the lack of support for the distribution of 
loan guarantees was only a 120 day delay and the executive branch would support the loan 
guarantees after the Madrid Conference.  
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On September 12, 1991, the Counsel of Presidents of Major America Jewish 
Organizations held a “National Leadership Action Day” calling for all of their supporters 
to use the day to lobby Congress for the acceptance of the loan guarantees without 
preconditions. In response to the challenge made by the pro-Israel lobby, on the same day 
President Bush held a press conference to publically condemn pro-Israel lobbyist efforts 
and announced he would use his veto power if Congress approved the loan guarantees. On 
October 2, 1991, the Senate agreed to delay the request for 120 days.  
On October 30, 1991 the Madrid Conference was officiated in coordination with 
the U.S. and the USSR. The conference marked a starting point for bilateral negotiations 
between Arab states and Israel. Although Israel attended the conference, Israeli Prime 
Minister Rabin, supported by his right-wing coalition in the Knesset, refused territorial 
concessions and would not even discuss Palestinian autonomy of land. Despite the lack of 
progress towards the discussion of territorial issues, the Madrid Conference was 
considered a success for the U.S by the global community.  The American cosponsored 
event initiated bilateral talks between Israel and their neighboring Arab countries, 
providing hope for a peace settlement.  Even though many celebrated the Madrid Peace 
Conference as a success, it was seen as a disaster by right-wing Zionists in Israel, whom 
feared pursuing peace would require giving up land occupied during the 1967 Six Day 
War1.  
                                                
1 Right-wing Zionists in Israel support “Eretz Yisrael” or “Greater Israel” and believe that the state should 
occupy the land of historical Israel as described in the Old Testament.  This includes all land from the Nile 
River to the Euphrates River. 
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For the peace process to continue, Arab states at the Madrid Conference demanded 
foreign powers ensure Israel stops its practice of settlement expansion on the OPT. Arab 
countries contended if Israel were allowed to continue settlement expansion while 
negotiating territory borders, it would have no reason to come to a conclusion because by 
delaying the peace process, Israel would be able to change demographic facts on the 
ground regarding who resides in certain contended areas.  Since the executive branch 
wanted to be credited with assisting Israel and the Arab states in achieving peace and 
recognized for its positive influence in the region after the Gulf War, they acquiesced to 
Arab demands.  
The pro-Israel lobby continued to be split in regards to the benefits of a settlement 
freeze. The left-wing of the American pro-Israel lobby argued a settlement freeze was 
necessary for the peace process to continue. The right-wing of the pro-Israel lobby argued 
settlement activities had no relationship to the peace process. However, upon the 
conclusion of the Madrid Conference, internal politics within the pro-Israel lobby shifted.  
As both sides made their arguments about the relationship between peace and settlements, 
some members of the right-wing pro-Israel lobby agreed a settlement freeze was necessary 
for peace.  This led to some right-wing pro-Israel groups to approve of President Bush’s 
loan guarantee policy in hopes for peace. For instance, the American Jewish Congress 
lobbied in support of the president’s policy linking loan guarantees to a settlement freeze 
in hopes it would bring peace to the Middle East: 
We propose that the Administration consider offering Israel the full $2 billion per 
year for two years – a total of $4 billion – on condition that there be a freeze on 
settlements (either publicly or in some other form). That would be an offer no 
Israeli government would find politically possible to turn down. If it is accepted 
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and results effectively in a settlement freeze, the cost will have been well worth it. 
If it is refused, the Administration will be able to say convincingly that it was 
prepared to respond generously to a humanitarian request. That is not something it 
can say now. (The Administration might also be able to leverage its willingness to 
take certain risks (i.e. generous loan guarantees to Israel before U.S. elections at a 
time of serious domestic economic constraint for the sake of obtaining a settlement 
freeze) to urge Arab countries to be more forthcoming in affirming their acceptance 
of Israel’s legitimacy. In combination with the loan guarantees and a halt in 
settlements, this could increase exponentially the chances for progress in the peace 
negotiations.) (Siegman 1992) 
 
Due to insurances from both the pro-Arab and pro-Israel community that a 
settlement freeze would benefit the continued peace process, the executive branch decided 
to take an even harder stance against settlements. Upon the success of the Madrid 
Conference, the executive branch announced it would not allow loan guarantees to be 
released until Israel stopped all settlement expansion and initiated a complete settlement 
freeze. 
Although the President had agreed with Congressmen Leahy, Kasten and Inouye 
during their September 11, 1991 lunch meeting that he would support the loan guarantees 
after the Madrid Conference, the executive branch changed its position and refused to 
consider a policy providing Israel with loan guarantees without preconditions.  
Emboldened by the shift of political power in their favor, when Congress reconvened after 
the agreed 120 day delay in February 1992, the executive branch established the 
precondition Israel freeze settlement construction before the loan guarantees be issued. On 
February 25, 1992, Secretary of State Baker testified before the House Appropriations 
Subcommittee to explain and enforce the President’s position.  
After the executive branch’s announcement regarding its opposition to the 
distribution of loan guarantees without preconditions, AIPAC and its ever-shrinking 
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coalition of pro-Israel lobbyist groups began to push its supporters in the Foreign 
Operations Appropriations subcommittee to create a bi-partisan negotiation with the 
executive branch to allow for the loan guarantees to be immediately released. AIPAC 
began to pressure congressmen up for re-election, including the chairman of the 
Appropriations Committee’s Foreign Operations subcommittee, Senator Leahy, and the 
subcommittee’s ranking minority member, Representative Kasten.  Although both of the 
congressmen had supported Bush’s policy of delaying the loan guarantees until after the 
Madrid Conference, now the conference was over and the 120 day delay had elapsed, they 
began to press for the loan guarantees to be distributed to Israel without preconditions with 
the next foreign operations appropriations bill.  
By March 1992, the Leahy-Kasten proposal was presented to the President and 
Congress as a compromise to the President’s request for Israel to freeze settlement 
construction.  The pro-Israel lobby backed compromise allotted an immediate $1 billion in 
loan guarantees to be provided with a deduction of $200 million as a dollar-for-dollar 
reduction penalty for money already spent by Israel on settlements in 1992. The 
compromise requested for the other $9 billion be released at a later date with the 
precondition Israel stop settlement expansion, excluding the natural growth of the 
settlement population and security settlements in strategic areas of the OPT (U.S. Congress 
1992). When presented with the compromise, President Bush claimed he would veto the 
proposal.  
In response to a lack of support from the executive branch in regards to the Leahy-
Kasten compromise, Senator Lautenberg drafted a nonbinding Senate resolution in support 
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for “appropriate loan guarantees” for Israel (Doherty 1992c). The nonbinding Senate 
resolution (Senate Resolution 277) was approved 99-1, with only Senator Robert Byrd 
voting against it. However, as pointed out by Senator Dole when explaining his approval 
of the resolution, the draft was loosely worded to the point it could either mean support or 
opposition for the executive branch’s loan guarantee policy (Doherty 1992c). 
Throughout the development of the Bush loan guarantee process, the Israel lobby 
was split on the connection between foreign aid and settlement growth. Although AIPAC 
did not support the link, other pro-Israel lobbyists supported the policy. Instead of blaming 
Bush for causing problems to the peace process and U.S. -Israel relations, they blamed 
Israeli Prime Minister Shamir for his policy expanding settlements in the OPT (Seliktar 
2002). However, not only was the American pro-Israel lobby split on the policy, so were 
Israelis.  The pro-Israel lobby was divided in regards to the perceived benefits of pursuing 
the peace process. Many Israeli citizens wanted to continue to pursue peace, even if it 
meant giving up the OPT.  However, the Shamir government was held together by Zionist 
conservatives and others whom opposed giving up land for peace.  
After Shamir attended the Madrid Peace Conference, his far-right coalition in the 
Knesset collapsed and new elections were called. Due to his dependence upon the right-
wing parties within the Knesset to consolidate his coalition, during the election campaign, 
Shamir stressed Zionist ideology and voiced angst in regards to participating in the U.S. 
lead peace process. On the other hand, Shamir’s contender, Yitzhak Rabin, advocated 
pragmatism and campaigned to improve Israeli ties with the U.S. by pursuing the peace 
process on practical, not ideological terms.   
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Yitzhak Rabin of the centrist Labour party won a clear victory over Shamir on June 
23, 1992.  Upon solidifying his coalition in the Knesset with left-leaning Meretz bloc and 
Shas religious party, Rabin conceded to President Bush’s demands for pre-conditions 
(Haberman 1992).  On July 19, 1992, the new Israeli Prime Minister Rabin formally 
announced a halt on new settlement activity. 
During the newly elected Israeli Prime Minister’s visit to Washington, DC from 
August 12, 1992 to August 13, 1992, President Bush announced the loan guarantees would 
be provided to Israel with various pre-conditions. Due to political fragmentation among the 
pro-Israel lobby and with the political support of powerful capitalist groups, the 1992 
Israeli housing loan guarantee policy was established linking Israeli foreign aid to its 
settlement activities, among other conditions.  On September 11, 1992, President Bush sent 
the recommended legislation to the Senate. Representative Obey introduced H.R. 5368 
(1992) without any changes. On October 5, 1992, Congress approved the President’s 
recommended legislation regarding the loan guarantee program as Title VI of the Foreign 
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1993.  
The executive branch’s loan guarantee program included numerous preconditions 
for the distribution of loan guarantees to Israel. First of all, the loan guarantees were linked 
to settlement expansion, as desired by the Department of State, Arab lobbyists, and left-
wing pro-Israel lobbyists and opposed by AIPAC and their supporters in Congress. As 
requested by the President, in order to maintain executive branch power over the terms of 
the agreement, according to Title IV- Loan Guarantees to Israel, the President had the 
power to suspend or terminate all loan guarantees to Israel if Israel were to spend any 
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Israeli government money on the OPT. Besides providing the President with the ability to 
stop or postpone the loan guarantees, Title IV also included an automatic requirement any 
money Israel spent in the OPT should be reduced from the amount of the loan guarantees.  
Unlike the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1990, due to pro-
business lobbyist efforts, Israel was required to pay fees associated with the loan 
guarantees. Nevertheless, there was some conflict over the amount of fees to be paid. The 
Office of Management and Budget originally estimated the subsidy cost at 7 percent, but 
upon improved relations with Israel after Rabin was elected, it later changed its estimate to 
4.5 percent. However, the Congressional Budget Office, which makes independent 
estimates for Congress, estimated the subsidy cost at the much higher rate of 13 percent 
(Doherty 1992d). Although Senator Leahy downplayed the issue as just a bookkeeping 
matter since Israel had agreed to pay the full cost of fees associated with the distribution of 
loan guarantees, the large Congressional Budget Office subsidy estimate required the 
Appropriations sub-Committee to trim $283 million of their budget authority.  In effect, 
the CBO estimate caused Congress to eliminate some funds attributed to the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which provided loans to newly emerging 
capitalist democracies in the former USSR. The last precondition included in Title IV was 
also established out of pro-business concerns for the Israeli economy. According to the 
Israeli Loan Guarantee policy, Israel was required to be consulted on their economic 
measures such as privatization and deregulation.  
One day after Title IV of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related 
Programs Appropriations Act of 1993 was approved by Congress, President Bush signed 
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the bill into law, marking the first time U.S. foreign policy attempted to deter Israeli 
settlement expansion by linking Israeli foreign aid with its settlement activities in the OPT.   
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
From this analysis, several conclusions can be drawn about how U.S. foreign policy 
in the Middle East is formed. First of all, it is shown that neither external interest groups, 
nor the state have complete control in determining U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.  
Contradicting the assumptions of state perspectives of political power, foreign policy is 
neither an independent product of state managers nor is it purely the result of national 
interests.  Although Israeli settlements have always been contradictory to U.S. national 
interests, it was only once powerful capitalist class fractions supported the executive 
branch that state managers were able to obtain the power necessary to deter Israeli 
settlements through financial disincentives.  Nevertheless, state managers never had the 
autonomous power to dictate the policy formation process.  Although the executive branch 
disapproved of the provision of the 1990 Israeli loan guarantees, the foreign aid was 
provided due to the power of the ideological pro-Israel lobbyist groups. However, during a 
time of economic decline and war, when capitalist class interests aligned with the interests 
of the executive branch, the state was able to have the political power to establish financial 
disincentives to Israeli settlement expansion in the OPT. Although members of the state 
have influence in determining public policy, their construction of public policy is largely 
affected by outside forces.  
Although the state was not autonomous, it influenced the alignment of competing 
class fractions. The social groups that held power varied over time in response to historical 
conditions and previous state policy.  Changing state policies, such as transformations in 
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U.S. immigration procedures, the original enactment of providing housing loans to Israel, 
entrance into the Gulf War, and the Madrid Conference, impacted class cohesiveness.  
During the economic downturn of the early 1990s class cohesiveness increased and their 
interests aligned with the state over the pro-Israel lobby.  This variance in state power 
contradicts society-centered perspectives which view the state as a neutral force 
negotiating conflict among competing social groups. State managers have interests related 
to their position within the state.  Under the condition their interests align with an external 
power block, state managers have the power to influence the policy formation process. Just 
like the state, the pro-Israel lobby is not an autonomous force steering U.S. foreign policy 
in the Middle East.  The power of the pro-Israel lobby to achieve their political interests 
varies over time.  When the interests of the pro-Israel lobby align with the state and 
capitalist interests, the pro-Israel lobby has increased power.  However, when the pro-
Israel lobby’s interests are contrary to the interests of the state and capital accumulation in 
the U.S., the pro-Israel lobby has less power.  Analysis shows the distribution of political 
power changes in relation to varying rates of capital accumulation.   
The historical analysis demonstrates both state structures and class segments 
impact U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.  Neither state nor society perspectives of 
class power fully explain the policy formation process.  Evidence indicates a lack of 
cohesion among class segments and the variation of relationships among class segments 
over time, depending upon expanding state structures and other historical elements. These 
findings are consistent with historical contingency theory assumptions that class segments 
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impact policy, the relationship between class segments change over time and the expansion 
of state structures can influence the relationship and cohesion of class segments.  
In conclusion, in order to understand the policy formation process, analysis shows 
both the power of the state and the power of class segments must be considered within 
their historical conditions.  Analysis cannot focus solely upon the actions of state 
managers, nor should it only examine the actions of social groups external to the state. 
Neither national interests nor lobbyist group interests strictly determine political outcomes.  
This research shows foreign policy is the result of both interest groups and state structures 
driven by the accumulation of capital.  Future studies on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle 
East should examine how and under what conditions do groups external to the state 
influence the policy formation process.   
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